

Letter dated 8 November 2018 from the Eminent Person appointed pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/252, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations

In my capacity as Eminent Person reappointed pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/252, I have the honour to submit an interim report on progress (Interim Report) in relation to the enquiry into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him (Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation).

In resolution 72/252, among other things, the General Assembly encouraged all Member States that may hold relevant information to appoint, without any delay, an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of their intelligence, security and defence archives. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to provide an oral briefing before the end of this year on any progress made, and to report to the General Assembly again before the end of its seventy-third session on any further progress made. To this end, the present correspondence is followed by an Interim Report that includes a summary of the activities of the Eminent Person in 2018 to facilitate the briefing of the General Assembly before the end of this year, in compliance with resolution 72/252.

As will be seen from the Interim Report that follows, significant work has been undertaken since my reappointment as Eminent Person in March 2018. Utilising the language of resolution 72/252, I immediately made requests to nine Member States that they appoint an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of their intelligence, security and defence archives. I am pleased to report that the Member States of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Sweden, and the United States have made such appointments or otherwise taken action in response to the resolution and my requests.

I have received new information from some of these independent and high-ranking officials, as well as directly from other sources, and will assess its probative value, in accordance with my mandate.

I am particularly grateful to Mr. Guy Rapaille and Dr. Kris Quanten (Belgium), Professor Maurice Vaïsse (France), Ambassador Dr. Thomas Fitschen (Germany), and Ambassador Mathias Mossberg (Sweden), the independent and high-ranking officials appointed by their respective Governments. Each of these appointees has undertaken significant work since their appointment and provided a substantive interim report to me in October 2018. Although my review of their reports has necessarily been preliminary, there are indications that the material that some have reviewed, including within intelligence, security, and defence archives, holds new information of probative value relevant to the context and surrounding events of 1961, the presence of foreign paramilitary and intelligence personnel in and around the Congo, and the capacity of armed forces present in and around the region at that time. I am presently reviewing this information and will

continue to work with these appointees prior to providing a full analysis to you in my forthcoming report in 2019, as requested.

Of the initial nine Member States requested, South Africa and the United Kingdom did not respond to my request of March 2018, or to subsequent requests. Subsequent to the date of the finalisation of my Interim Report, I received correspondence from the United Kingdom stating that it did not intend to appoint an independent and high-ranking official. For completeness, I have amended my Interim Report to reflect this correspondence, and, for the reasons discussed therein, would renew my request that the United Kingdom also make an appointment in accordance with resolution 72/252.

In recent months I made requests for appointments to five additional Member States, being Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Portugal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. I have already received notification from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe of their appointments of independent and high-ranking officials, for which I am grateful, and I will continue to follow up in this regard.

As noted in the report of the Eminent Person appointed pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/260 (the 2017 Report), the burden of proof has shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of all records and archives in their custody or possession, including those within intelligence, security and defence archives. As also noted in that Report, it appears to be established from contemporaneous documentary evidence that, at the time of the initial enquiries in 1961-62, officials of Member States may have failed to disclose all relevant information, or attempted to influence the early inquiries while they remained ongoing. It still cannot currently be said that Member States have fully identified all information that they hold. It is premature at this stage to draw any specific inferences in relation to this issue; however, it is a topic on which I anticipate being required to comment more comprehensively in my full report to you in 2019.

In light of developments that suggest the plausibility of a hypothesis that the tragic event may have resulted from external interference, it follows that there is additional impetus to encourage all Member States to apply every possible endeavour in promoting transparency and cooperation within the current framework, in accordance with the efforts of the General Assembly. The active participation of Member States is therefore of paramount importance to identify the information that will allow us to fill the remaining gaps in the narrative, and is a step that must be taken together in our shared search for the truth of the tragic incident.

Although my Interim Report is preliminary in nature, it is encouraging to note that Member States have on the whole engaged proactively with this process, allowing meaningful progress to be made. In this regard, I renew my request, Excellency, for your personal engagement with a view to seeking the full cooperation and participation of Member States in accordance with resolution 72/252.

(Signed) Mohamed Chande **Othman**
Eminent Person

Interim report of the Eminent Person appointed pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/252

1. Background

General Assembly resolution 72/252 welcomed the 2017 Report, noted important conclusions, and adopted its recommendations. In this regard, operative paragraphs 1 – 6 of resolution 72/252 expressed the wishes of the General Assembly in the following terms:

[The General Assembly]

- 1. Requests the Secretary-General to reappoint the Eminent Person appointed pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/260 to continue to review the potential new information, including that which may be available from Member States, to assess its probative value, to determine the scope that any further inquiry or investigation should take and, if possible, to draw conclusions from the investigations already conducted;*
- 2. Urges all Member States to release any relevant records in their possession and to provide to the Secretary-General relevant information related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him;*
- 3. Encourages Member States to ensure that any relevant records related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him that remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact, are declassified or otherwise made available for review;*
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations reviews its own specific records and archives for possible declassification of information relevant to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him;*
- 5. Encourages all Member States that may hold relevant information related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him to appoint, without any delay, an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of their intelligence, security and defence archives to determine whether relevant information exists, and to communicate a summary of the results to the Secretary-General before the end of the main part of its seventy-third session under such confidentiality arrangements as presented in the report of the Eminent Person;*
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to explore the feasibility of establishing a central archival holding or other holistic arrangement for records and archives related to the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him and to provide to the General Assembly concrete and actionable recommendations thereon.*

As established in the 2017 Report, it appears almost certain that relevant, undisclosed information exists within the records and archives of certain Member States. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the burden of proof has shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of all records and archives in their custody or possession, including those within intelligence, security and defence archives, whether classified or not, for potentially relevant information. The above language of resolution 72/252, which reflects the conclusions and recommendations of the 2017 Report, underscores the emphasis that the General Assembly has placed on the cooperation of its Member States with the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation.

2. Description of activities

In accordance with the above operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 72/252, the following actions have been undertaken since the reappointment of the Eminent Person in March 2018.

2.1 Initial requests to nine Member States

In March 2018, I wrote to nine Member States to request that each appoint an independent and high-ranking official (Independent Appointee) in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of the above resolution. The Member States to which this request was made in March 2018 were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. These Member States are the same as those of which enquiries have been made in previous years in relation to this matter, as a result of those Member States having been identified from the existing record to be the most likely to hold information of probative value.

In compliance with my requests, appointments of Independent Appointees were made and communicated to me by Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States, as follows:

Belgium

Mr. Guy Rapaille, President of the Standing Committee of Control of Intelligence and Security Services (Committee R) and Advocate General at the Liege Court of Appeal, and Dr. Kris Quanten, Lieutenant-Colonel Military Instructor and Head of the Chair of Military History at the Royal Military School.

Canada

Mr. Jeffrey Marder, Director, United Nations Division, Global Affairs.

France

Emeritus Professor Maurice Vaïsse, (Sciences Po), Editor of the French Diplomatic Documents.

Germany

Undersecretary Hans Vorbeck, Commissioner for processing the history of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), Chancellery (from May 2018 until June 2018); Ambassador Dr. Thomas Fitschen, Special Representative for Cyber Foreign Policy and Cybersecurity, Federal Foreign Office, (from August 2018).

Sweden

Ambassador (ret.) Mathias Mossberg.

United States

Mr. Eric Gaudiosi, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Bureau of International Organizations, US Department of State (from March 2018 until September 2018); Mr. Joseph Manso, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organizations, US Department of State (from October 2018).

Separate correspondence was received from the Russian Federation, as follows.

Russia

In May 2018, following my requests, I was advised by note verbale from the Russian Federation that the competent authorities of the Russian Federation were conducting a review of intelligence, security, and defence archives to determine whether information relevant to the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation exists.

I am grateful to the above Member States for their prompt action, taken towards the implementation of resolution 72/252. As at the date of this letter, neither South Africa nor the United Kingdom appointed an Independent Appointee. Details of my communications with these Member States is as follows.

South Africa

In respect of South Africa, my requests for assistance in 2017 were not answered. Between March and September 2018, I made numerous formal and informal approaches to South Africa. I also requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make high-level approaches to the Government of South Africa, and requested the same of the late former Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan. Despite this, South Africa has not appointed an

Independent Appointee. On the basis of documentation evaluated by the Independent Panel of Experts in 2015 and by the Eminent Person in 2017, it is reasonable to form an informed view that it is almost certain that South Africa may hold relevant information, the probative value of which would need to be assessed for the purposes of the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation.

United Kingdom

In respect of the United Kingdom, I was grateful for the assistance that I received in 2017. However, despite formal and informal approaches having been made on numerous occasions between March and September 2018, the United Kingdom has not appointed an Independent Appointee. On the basis of documentation evaluated by the Independent Panel of Experts in 2015 and by the Eminent Person in 2017, I assess that it is almost certain that the United Kingdom may hold as yet undisclosed relevant information, the probative value of which would need to be assessed for the purposes of the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation.

Subsequent to the date of my initial preparation of this Interim Report, on 9 November 2018, I received a response from the United Kingdom to my request of March 2018. This response stated that the United Kingdom did not intend to appoint an independent and high-ranking official because all information of direct value to the Investigation had been made available by the United Kingdom in previous years or had been released and is available publicly. It was also stated that having previously and recently searched there was no further information of direct value to the Investigation. As noted in the 2017 Report, the deeper we have gone into the searches, the more relevant information has been found, and, as the body of knowledge has expanded, further potentially relevant areas have been revealed. Among other possibilities, intelligence, security and defence archives of Member States have now been identified as probable sources for the generation of further new and relevant information, and it is not yet clear whether these archives have been searched by Member States, including the United Kingdom. For these reasons and on the basis of information I have reviewed, I assess that it would remain essential for the comprehensiveness of the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation that the United Kingdom appoint an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of intelligence, security and defence archives in accordance with resolution 72/252. I will renew my request to the United Kingdom in this regard.

2.2 Additional Member States

In May and July 2018, the United Nations Legal Counsel transmitted a note verbale to all Member States requesting those that may hold relevant information, but had not yet appointed an independent and high-ranking official to conduct a dedicated internal review of their intelligence, security and defence archives, to do so. Further to this, in June 2018 I wrote to Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Portugal, Zambia, and

Zimbabwe, to request that each of these Member States also appoint an Independent Appointee. Although direct enquiries were not made of these Member States in previous years in relation to this matter, I have identified from the existing record that it is possible that they may also hold relevant information.

In compliance with my requests, appointments of Independent Appointees were made and communicated to me by the DRC and Zimbabwe, as follows:

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Mr. Daniel Felix Thabize Yengola Selemani, Political and Strategic Advisor, Military Intelligence.

Zimbabwe

Dr. Sidney Tigere Sekeramayi, former Minister of Defence and State Secretary, assisted by Brigadier General (ret.) Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi.

I am grateful to the above Member States for their very prompt action, taken towards the implementation of resolution 72/252. Given that I only recently made requests to Angola, Portugal, and Zambia, I look forward to engaging with these Member States with a view to their imminent appointment of an Independent Appointee.

As noted in the 2017 Report, given the decolonization process and geopolitical situation around and including the Congo in the 1960s, as well as contributions made to United Nations operations around that time, it remains possible that other Member States may also hold relevant information. To the extent that further developments suggest the presence of such information within other Member States, I will make direct approaches to them.

2.3 Information from other sources

In accordance with my mandate under resolution 72/252, I have continued to receive and review new information from non-Member State sources. As in previous years, I have been greatly aided by the generous contributions by individuals of information and assistance. I will provide a comprehensive assessment of the probative value of this new information in my full report to you in 2019, as well as an expression of my gratitude to those individuals who have provided it.

3. Assessment of progress

3.1 Member States that have responded to the request to appoint an Independent Appointee

I am pleased that a majority of the Member States requested have made appointments of Independent Appointees, or otherwise taken positive action regarding General Assembly resolution 72/252. A pro forma version of the letters that I sent to Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Russia and the United States is included as an Annex to this Interim Report. The reports that I have received in response so far are summarised as follows.

Belgium

By the requested deadline of October 2018, Messrs Rapaille and Quanten provided a comprehensive interim report indicating the substantial work undertaken by them. The interim report confirms that full access was given by Belgium to all files and archives kept by the Ministry of Defence, the State Security service (VSSE) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS, military intelligence service). The report observes that the mandate has not covered a review of the archives of non-state actors or private organisations.

The interim report from Belgium identifies information relevant to the presence of foreign paramilitary and intelligence personnel in and around the Congo at the relevant time, as well as to the capacity of the aerial forces of Katanga.

France

By the requested deadline of October 2018, Professor Vaïsse provided a comprehensive interim report. This report makes reference to his substantial research in diplomatic and private archives. Searches with respect to intelligence, security and military archives are to commence soon.

The interim report from France identifies information relevant to the political context, including France – UN relations and surrounding events of 1961, the presence of French paramilitary personnel in and around the Congo at that time, and the capacity of the aerial forces of Katanga. Of particular note is information concerning the presence of French mercenaries acting as officers in the armed forces of Katanga, apparently paid for by the Belgian company Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK).

Germany

By the requested deadline of October 2018, Ambassador Fitschen provided an interim report. I note that Ambassador Fitschen had only been appointed as successor to this role in August 2018, and I am grateful that he worked to provide material to me prior to the date of

this letter. From this report it appears that searches so far have only been made in the political archives of the Federal Foreign Office (FFO).

The interim report from Germany identifies information relevant to the capacity of the aerial forces of Katanga and the Gendarmerie.

Sweden

By the requested deadline of October 2018, Ambassador Mossberg provided a comprehensive interim report. This interim report confirmed that, following the taking of a cabinet-level decision, Sweden had provided full access to all records and archives, regardless of level of classification, including within intelligence, security and defense archives.

The interim report from Sweden identifies information relevant to the context and surrounding events of 1961, the presence of foreign paramilitary and intelligence personnel in and around the Congo at that time, and the capacity of the aerial forces of Katanga. Reference is made to explosive devices having been fabricated in Katanga for use by its aerial forces, reportedly with the involvement of UMHK.

I have received some of the source information referred to in the interim reports of the Independent Appointees. I expect that in coming months I will liaise with Independent Appointees in order to identify the information that appears to be most relevant, and request access to this source material for my independent assessment, including the allocation of probative value.

I did not receive interim reports in the format requested from Russia or the United States by the requested deadline of October 2018. I make the following observations.

Russia

I note that Russia has not appointed an Independent Appointee. In May 2018, its Permanent Mission confirmed that its authorities were conducting a comprehensive review, including of intelligence, security and defense archives. On 5 October 2018 I was further informed that no relevant information has yet been discovered by the competent authorities. Notwithstanding the initiative and step taken, I believe that it may still be useful to appoint an Independent Appointee to confirm any findings, and/or continue with this endeavour in accordance with the spirit of resolution 72/252, and request that the Secretary-General use his good offices to engage with representatives of Russia to request the appointment of an Independent Appointee, to formalise the work already done by its Government.

United States

In October 2018 I was advised that searches by the United States remain ongoing. Further details were not provided.

3.2 Member States that have not taken action further to resolution 72/252

As noted above, two of the initial nine Member States have not taken action further to resolution 72/252 and my requests, despite multiple requests to do so over the course of this year. This is regrettable given that, as noted in the 2017 Report, information made available to the United Nations so far has been insufficient to come to conclusions about the cause or causes of the crash, and it seems likely that both of these Member States may hold relevant undisclosed information.

The current stage of the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation represents a continuation of the process under the auspices of the United Nations that was formally recommenced over four years ago when Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon made recommendations to the General Assembly to reinvigorate the enquiry after his formal assessment that new evidence existed. Following the decision of the General Assembly in resolution 69/246, specific and direct requests for information were made in 2015 to Belgium, France, Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and then again in 2017. Requests for information were also made to Canada and Russia in 2017.

Given the engagement over preceding years and the contents of the Reports of 2015 (Report of the Independent Panel of Experts), and 2017 (Report of the Eminent Person), Member States are familiar with the material in question, and it was foreseeable that the foregoing Member States would be requested in 2018 to appoint independent and high-ranking officials in line with resolution 72/252. For this reason, the fact that certain Member States have not responded to repeated requests in 2018 to make such an appointment in line with resolution 72/252, or to engage with this process at all, has a crucial bearing on the success or failure on the full implementation of the above General Assembly resolution.

4. Observations by Eminent Person

The level of commitment to this process as shown by the efforts of a majority of the above Member States is encouraging, and significant work has already been undertaken in compliance with resolution 72/252. On the basis of the information provided to me in the form of the interim reports, the Independent Appointees of Belgium, France, Germany, and Sweden in particular have made meaningful progress in the continuing search for records relevant to the tragic event. I would again express my gratitude to these Independent Appointees, and commend their work to their respective Governments.

To the extent that Independent Appointees may require further support from their Governments for them to complete the substantial work that remains, I would respectfully request that endeavours be made to ensure that all Appointees have the necessary resources and assistance to finalise their reviews within the coming months.

I note that some Member States have made appointments of Appointees from within their Government departments. Noting that such existing roles may have an effect on the perceived independence of their respective reviews, I will be requesting positive confirmation of the independence and impartiality of Appointees' work. I will also be requesting confirmation of the level of access that Appointees have been granted, including whether there have been any materials that they have not been permitted to access and review. One of the main thrusts of this General Assembly mandated effort is to ensure that all records are accessed and assessed, in order for the full truth on the tragic event to be ascertained. I may make further observations in this regard in my final report.

As noted in the 2017 Report, the burden of proof has shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of all records and archives in their custody or possession, including those within intelligence, security and defence archives, whether classified or not, for potentially relevant information.

Even though the world has changed greatly in the almost-60 years that have passed since the tragic event, it is acknowledged that there may still be security or other compelling reasons to justify caution regarding the disclosure of relevant information by Member States. However, in light of the passage of time, the circumstances that have led to the shifting of the burden of proof, and the continued need to search and arrive at the full truth on the tragic event, a minimum degree of cooperation may be anticipated. In the event that relevant information still cannot be disclosed, this minimum degree of cooperation should include undertaking a full review of all existing archives and records, and stating explicitly and unequivocally whether any such information has been identified. Without an explicit statement confirming the precise nature of the searches, particularly into the intelligence, security and military archives and records, an identification of whether relevant information exists, and an indication of the reasons for non-disclosure, the non-cooperation of any Member State may be seen as a failing in the international community's collective and ongoing effort in the search for the full truth of the tragic event.

As also noted in the 2017 Report, it appears that Member States may not have fully identified or disclosed all relevant information that they hold, which has in itself become a material fact in this matter. It is premature at this stage to draw any specific inferences on this issue. However, in my full report in 2019 it may be necessary to provide further specificity in relation to gaps in information and whether conclusions can be reached with reference to any lack of engagement with this process by any particular Member State(s). As has already been observed, if the full truth of the events of 17 and 18 September 1961 is to be known, then the allocation of the burden must now rest with the individual Member States that may hold relevant information to mandate a process by which all records can be reviewed, and to unequivocally report the outcome of that process.

In the interest of transparency, a copy of this Interim Report will be shared with those Member States that have been directly requested to make appointments of Independent Appointees pursuant to the resolution, and a copy of it will be attached as an Annex to the

full report of the Eminent Person, to be finalised before the end of its seventy-third session. I will also request individual Member States to agree that the final reports of their Independent Appointees be made publicly available, subject to any ongoing discussions concerning confidentiality.

ANNEX 1

Pro forma letter to independent and high ranking officials

I have the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 72/252, adopted on 24 December 2017, in respect of the investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him (the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation). I have the further honour to refer to correspondence confirming your appointment as the independent and high-ranking official (the Independent Appointee), mandated to conduct a dedicated internal review of records and archives, including intelligence, security and defence archives, to determine whether information relevant to the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation exists. In respect of this dedicated internal review of certain Member States' records and archives, I have established a framework and timeline that I am sharing with all Independent Appointees, as set out herein.

Nature of review

Regarding the scope of the review, General Assembly resolution 72/252 envisages that the review be conducted in a comprehensive and independent manner. For this reason, it should incorporate all public and private records and archives within each Member State's custody, possession, or control, including those that remain classified. Specifically, the review must include a search for relevant information within intelligence, security and defence archives, which categories are to be interpreted in a broad sense. Searches should not be limited to state records, but should include non-state records such as those of companies and individuals.

For the definition of what may be "relevant", this term should also be interpreted in a broad, non-exclusionary sense, rather than a technical or legal one; that is to say, a piece of information will be relevant if it may, by itself or in combination with other information, tend to add to or alter a complete understanding of the cause or causes of the plane crash, including by reference to events that occurred before, during, or after the night of 17–18 September 1961. A piece of information should thus not be described as "irrelevant" because, for example, an existing legal or other framework would not require it to be disclosed for security or other reasons. In this regard, it is recalled that the current process is initially one to identify whether relevant information exists, rather than to legally compel that such information be disclosed.

Areas of interest

The background to the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation is discussed in detail in recent reports, including most recently my report of 2017 as Eminent Person, available in the official languages of the United Nations here: <http://undocs.org/A/71/1042>.

Regarding the areas in which the searches should be prioritised, the initial area of interest relates to direct references to the incident that caused the death of Dag Hammarskjöld and his party when "the Albertina"—the Transair-chartered DC-6 undertaking flight SE-BDY between Leopoldville, Congo, and Ndola, Northern Rhodesia—crashed near Ndola just after midnight on 18 September 1961. Of course, in attempting to ascertain possible causes of that crash, the periods both immediately before and after the event

may be instructive. Further, it remains very important that the searches specifically ascertain whether any information refers to: (i) more than one aircraft being in the air at the same time as SE-BDY, (ii) flight SE-BDY being on fire before it impacted the ground, or (iii) that flight SE-BDY was fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by any other aircraft. The related area of key interest is whether there is information concerning the interceptions of communications, including the creation or existence of any radio intercepts and related records (such as, for example, tapes, transcripts, secondary/tertiary information (such as notes thereof), and other material), most particularly regarding possible communications on 17–18 September 1961 by or between SE-BDY, any other aircraft, ground forces and/or air traffic control.

Areas of secondary interest relate to the presence in and around Katanga of foreign intelligence agencies or personnel, foreign military, paramilitary or irregular (including mercenary) troops and/or personnel at the time, the capability of the armed forces of Katanga, including its air forces, attacks on United Nations forces (ONUC), and intelligence, security, technical and/or political cooperation with the provincial government of Katanga, as well as any information on the possible role of the Belgian company Union Minière (also known as Union Minière du Haut Katanga or UMHK), and/or the South African Institute for Maritime Research (also known by the acronym SAIMR). The identification of any such contextual material may assist in establishing the capacity of certain parties to conduct or facilitate an attack on or interference with SE-BDY, or suggest where further information may be found. Depending on the indications and results of the review of materials, it should also be possible to identify any other connected and relevant circumstances.

Process and timeline

In order that I may meet the deadlines set by the General Assembly, I would request that you conduct your work in accordance with the following timeframe:

- May – September 2018: The Independent Appointee commences the initial phase of the comprehensive review within the country concerned, including of intelligence, security and defence archives.
- 1 October 2018: The Independent Appointee provides a brief interim written report to me on progress, in a format discussed further below. This interim report identifies whether certain relevant information remains classified. To the extent necessary, information may be reported to me under appropriate conditions of confidentiality.
- November 2018: I will submit an update of progress to the Secretary-General, who in turn will provide an oral briefing to the General Assembly, as required by the above resolution.
- October 2018 – March 2019: To the extent required, the Independent Appointee continues with and finalises the review. A final written report is provided to me by 30 March 2019.
- April – May 2019: In the case that the Independent Appointee identifies relevant information that remains classified for national security or other compelling reasons, I will liaise with the relevant Government and consult with the United Nations Secretariat to discuss appropriate arrangements such as redaction or non-identification in my report.
- June 2019: I will provide my final report to the Secretary-General, who will transmit it to the General Assembly before the end of its 73rd session.

Content of reports

The Independent Appointee's interim and final reports should include:

1. A statement regarding whether the Independent Appointee has received from his or her Government an explicit statement or declaration confirming full access to all records and archives, regardless of level of classification.
2. A description of the methodology applied.
3. A description of the searches carried out, including confirmation of the categories of records and archives that have been included in the searches, noting which, if any, have been partially or wholly unavailable, and the reasons therefor.
4. A summary in index form of relevant information identified, including a description of the type of information, its location, what it is relevant to, and its retained classification, if any.
5. Subject to retention or classification of specific documents, full copies (print or electronic) of all relevant materials identified.
6. Any further relevant summary of activities, or other comments.
7. In conjunction with the preceding, if a review does not identify relevant information, I will request an explicit and unequivocal statement to that effect.

To the extent that any Member State may seek to retain the classification of information that it identifies, I will be in a position to discuss mechanisms, including the nature of any necessary confidentiality arrangements, to allow this stage of the Dag Hammarskjöld Investigation to be successful.

I envisage that the above process will benefit from our ongoing close collaboration. In this regard, I would hope that we will be able to communicate at regular intervals in order to discuss your progress, and how I may be of assistance to you in your work.

[Eminent Person]